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Research Article

Philippine National Police Initiatives in the Promotion of Peace and Order in Iligan City: Basis for Policy Recommendation

Noel D. Galabin^{1*}, Rowell B. Pallega² and Marvin A. Recapente³

¹College of Criminology, Saint Michael's College, Philippines

^{2,3}College of Criminal Justice Education, Jose Rizal Memorial State University, Philippines

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*Corresponding author:

E-mail:

ngalabin9@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This study aimed to determine the extent of the Philippine National Police Operation initiatives in the promotion of peace and order in Iligan City as a basis for policy recommendation. This study made use of a non-experimental quantitative research design utilizing the descriptive correlational technique, frequency count, percentage, mean and standard deviation, paired t-test, and Pearson-r correlations. The respondents exhibited a high level of response that the Philippine National Police always performed the police operational procedure initiatives in the promotion of peace and order. The finding showed that overall, there was a significant relationship between the frequency of implementation of police operations and the crime rate in terms of Index and non-index crime. Further studies are warranted.

Keywords: PNP initiatives, peace and order, Iligan City, policy recommendation.

Introduction

In the onset of emergency and crisis occurring in the Philippine area of responsibility, the Philippine National Police has to see to it that peace and order are maintained as manifested in every police precinct in order to prevent any forms of crime in the area. Initiatives of every police officer in dealing with the actual eminent danger are always put to test. These initiatives should be within the agency's procedure especially in addressing the various modes of action in the performance of a police function. This police initiative is needed whenever the safety and security of every citizen are at stake most

especially in the Philippines. There are many areas in the Philippines where the safety and security of people are in danger. One of these places is Iligan City. The policemen are given the responsibility especially in addressing the safety and security concerns of the city of Iligan in the advent of war in Marawi City (Lancion, 2015) that is only 38 kilometers away.

While the war in Marawi City (Placido, 2017) was at its peak, the City of Iligan struggles. The Philippine National Police- Iligan implemented its initiatives like the conduct of checkpoints to all entrance and exit points in

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Iligan City. Every individual who plans to enter the city should submit herself/himself for inspection and should present his/her identification card at all checkpoints. Internally displaced Persons (IDPs) flock to seek refuge in Iligan City (Baker, 2008) which adds up to the challenges of the policemen in maintaining peace and order as people were stressed and wary (Aljibe, 2017). The policemen were on the lookout for suspected terrorists as these persons were mingling with evacuees being Iligan City as the next target (Jerusalem, 2017).

Methodology

Methods

The study used quantitative research design. There were 282 Philippine National Police respondents, 25 barangay officials and 51 barangay tanods or BPAT respondents from three (3) central barangays namely; Barangays Poblacion, Mahayahay, and Pala-o. Data were treated using frequency and percentage count, t-test and person r correlation.

Results, Analysis and Discussion

Result and Discussion

Table 1. Public Safety Operation initiatives of the Philippine National Police

Indicators	PNP Personnel		Brgy. Official		Brgy. Tanod		Row Total	
	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE
1. Conducts Field Visits and Inspection;	4.41	A	3.64	O	3.57	O	4.24	A
2. Intensifies PNP Checkpoints;	4.51	A	4.00	O	3.47	O	4.33	A
3. Issues of Safety and Security Tips for public safety;	4.56	A	3.88	O	3.53	O	4.37	A
4. Facilitates activities on disaster preparedness and transplant.	4.38	A	3.80	O	3.53	O	4.22	A
Column Total (Over-all Mean)	4.47	A	3.83	O	3.52	O	4.29	A

Scale: 1.00 - 1.79 Never Perform; 1.80 – 2.59 Rarely Perform; 2.60 – 3.39 Sometimes Perform; 3.40 – 4.19 Often; 4.20 – 5.00 Always Perform

Table 1 shows the extent of the Philippine National Police Operation initiative in the promotion of peace and order in Iligan City in terms of the Public Safety. It shows that the overall mean indicates a Descriptive Equivalent as “Always perform”. This implies that the Philippine National Police personnel in Iligan City always perform the police operational manual of 2013 in promoting peace and order related to public safety. This includes conducting field visits, intensifying checkpoints, issuing of safety and security tips for public safety, and facilitating activities on disaster preparedness and transplant. This is in consonance with the study of Hess, et al. (2017) that community policing promotes organizational strategies, which support a systematic use of partnership and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate condition that give rise

to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.

This implies that the PNP personnel in Iligan City were doing their best to afford public safety so that the residents of Iligan City will not experience the incident that happened during the Marawi siege. Both barangay officials and the tanod present a descriptive equivalent as “Often perform” in all the public safety indicators. This is a good manifestation that the community in barangay level directly experience the PNP public safety initiatives and there was a direct participation between the community and the police. In support to this, the study of (Cappitelli, 2017) suggested that the police must secure the willing cooperation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public. One example to this when the PNP person-

nel in Iligan was able to coordinate with the local government of Marawi to commence the Oplan “Kambalingan ago kais-isa ko k

alilintad’ or the return of the residents of Marawi (David, 2017)

Table 2. Law Enforcement Operation Initiative of the Philippine National Police

Indicators	PNP Personnel		Brgy. Official		Brgy. Tanod		Row Total	
	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE
1. Takes action on all matters pertaining to organized crime, non-organized crime and special laws;	4.58	A	4.00	O	3.16	S	4.34	A
2. Implement operational plans on anti-criminality operation;	4.59	A	3.80	O	3.22	S	4.34	A
3. Involves in activities of the National Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee;	4.45	A	4.00	O	3.37	S	4.27	A
4. Takes appropriate action to firearm and Ordinance control and civil matters.	4.52	A	3.80	O	3.27	S	4.30	A
Column Total (Over-all Mean)	4.54	A	3.90	O	3.25	S	4.31	A

Scale: 1.00 - 1.79 Never Perform; 1.80 – 2.59 Rarely Perform; 2.60 – 3.39 Sometimes Perform; 3.40 – 4.19 Often; 4.20 – 5.00 Always Perform

Table 2 presents the data on Law Enforcement Operation initiatives of the Philippine National Police. The data revealed the over-all mean shows a descriptive equivalent of “Always perform”. This implies that the Philippine National Police personnel in Iligan City always perform the police operational manual of 2013 in promoting peace and order against organized and non-organized crimes, implement operational plans on anti-criminality operation, gets involved in activities of the National Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee, and takes appropriate action to firearm and Ordinance control and civil matters. This is consonance with the study of (Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006) that police should have the legal tool to remove the undesirable person from a neighborhood when informal efforts to preserve order in the streets have failed.

In addition, the result was consistent with the report of the Peace and Order Council (POC) of Iligan City that its Security level was number 3 that resulted to the significant decrease in crime volume in the city as the result of the declaration of martial law; sustained implementation of curfew hours in the city and the target hardening measures initiated by the PNP and AFP, (DILG R10, 2018)

It can be noted that the data also illustrates in detail the responses of the respondents on the initiatives of the Philippine National Police in terms of Law Enforcement operations. The barangay officials' over-all mean was 3.90 with a descriptive equivalent described as “Often perform” while the barangay Tanod over-mean was 3.25 with a descriptive equivalent described as “Sometimes perform”.

The result is in congruence with the study of Weatherburn and Grabosky (2017) which states that situational crime prevention approaches to property crime control are neither effective nor efficient. It advocates a greater commitment by police to the strategic analysis of property crime, and the mobilization of public/private partnerships to address those specific dimensions of the problem which are amenable to policy intervention. Police are encouraged to adopt a systematic approach to the task at hand. This will entail (1) identification of those specific components of the problem which are amenable to intervention, and (2) the development of partnerships with other governmental, non-governmental, and private institutions to address each specified component.

Table 3. Internal Security Operation Initiative of the Philippine National Police

Indicators	PNP Personnel		Brgy. Official		Brgy. Tanod		Row Total	
	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE
1. Coordinates and monitors against terrorist and other threat group;	4.58	A	3.60	O	3.61	O	4.37	A
2. Implement policies and directives on internal security;	4.55	A	3.52	O	3.63	O	4.35	A
3. Submit action based reports as contained in the intelligence brief;	4.55	A	3.60	O	3.69	O	4.36	A
4. Exercises ISO matters.	4.53	A	3.60	O	3.63	O	4.34	A
Column Total (<i>Over-all Mean</i>)	4.55	A	3.58	O	3.64	O	4.36	A

Scale: 1.00 - 1.79 *Never Perform*; 1.80 – 2.59 *Rarely Perform*; 2.60 – 3.39 *Sometimes Perform*; 3.40 – 4.19 *Often*; 4.20 – 5.00 *Always Perform*

Table 3 presents data on internal security operation initiatives of the Philippine National Police personnel. The results revealed that internal security operations have been given so much care and these are all evident most of the time. These claims were concretized by the overall mean that shows a descriptive equivalent described as “always perform”. As suggested by Herbert (2017) ordered and clean environment, one that is maintained, sends the signal that the area is monitored and that criminal behavior is not tolerated.

This implies that internal security has been a priority of the PNP personnel through coordinating and monitoring against terrorists and other threat groups and implementing policies and directives on internal security. More so, PNP personnel submits action based on reports as contained in the intelligence brief and applies Internal Security Operation matters in the fulfilment of their job. This implies that PNP personnel in Iligan City conducted counter-insurgency operations, counter-terrorist operations, and similar operations to ensure internal security. The result was supported by the study of Hess, et al. (2017) which states that police activities as they serve and protect include patrol, traffic investigation, and a general call for

service as it is the most critical operation in the law enforcement.

In addition, the response of barangay officials and the barangay tanod on internal security operation initiatives of the Philippine National Police personnel was consistent with a descriptive equivalent described as “Often perform”.

Likewise, the study of Begert and Linsay (2017) is congruent with the result. They state that the ability to collect, process and analyze information to create useful intelligence, the ability to operate as a network, and thereby leverage speed of information, dissemination, and decision making are key capabilities and functional goals.

Furthermore, the study of Carter and Phillips (2017) is in consonance with the result. The state and local agencies' familiarity with the intelligence-led concept and utilization of open source and received information appear to be driving the adoption proactive approach to policing, including intelligence led-policing and public-facing crime maps. As such, officers are now able to better consider spatial patterns related to historic crime and determine more informedly where crimes may occur in the future (Herchenrader and Jones, 2017).

Table 4. Special Police Operation Initiative of the Philippine National Police

Indicators	PNP Personnel		Brgy. Official		Brgy. Tanod		Row Total	
	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE
1. Participate on all matters pertaining to security operations for special events and diplomats;	4.51	A	3.56	O	3.57	O	4.31	A
2. Follow policies and directives on security for special events and diplomats;	4.55	A	3.68	O	3.63	O	4.36	A
3. Attend briefings and special reports on security operation for special events and diplomats;	4.51	A	3.52	O	3.65	O	4.32	A
4. Participates in specialized training of peculiarity mission and purpose.	4.47	A	3.60	O	3.63	O	4.29	A
Column Total (<i>Over-all Mean</i>)	4.51	A	3.59	O	3.62	O	4.32	A

Scale: 1.00 - 1.79 *Never Perform*; 1.80 - 2.59 *Rarely Perform*; 2.60 - 3.39 *Sometimes Perform*; 3.40 - 4.19 *Often*; 4.20 - 5.00 *Always Perform*

Table 4 presents the data on the special police operation initiatives of the Philippine National Police. Reflected on the table was an overall mean that shows a described equivalent described as “Always perform”. This means that the special police operations were always performed by the Philippine National Police personnel of Iligan City in their initiative of peace and order related to the special police operation.

This implies that PNP always performs all matters pertaining to security operations, follows policies and directives on security for special events, attends briefings and special reports on security operations and they participate in specialized training of peculiarity mission and purpose.

Along this line, it could be said that PNP personnel did special police operations on regular basis. Special police operations are very important especially in times where there are intelligence reports and the heads of offices have to make special assignments for PNP personnel. Along this line, the PNP personnel could be

said to have adherence to special assignments in order to keep peace and order at a stable pace as much as possible.

The study of Fell et al (2017) supported this which states that special police operation is important as a special intervention that provides, among other things, assistance to the police unit in connection with hostage situations, dangerous arrest operations, difficult intervention assignments, and other special assignments where the standard police training or equipment is inadequate. The police unit that has requested assistance in connection with a police assignment is responsible for the initiation and implementation of the police operation.

Furthermore, Martial law in Mindanao covers 17, 494 checkpoint operations, curfew hours in 129 cities, (Capistrano, 2017). Flexible checkpoints are a versatile, low-cost tool that virtually any sized law enforcement agency can adapt to enhance enforcement methods and increase public awareness of enforcement efforts (Lacey, Wiliszowski, Tippetts, and Blackman, 2017).

Table 5. Intelligence Operation Initiative of the Philippine National Police

Indicators	PNP Personnel		Brgy. Official		Brgy. Tanod		Row Total	
	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE
1. Each PNP personnel conducts covert Surveillance operation;	4.29	A	3.20	O	3.47	O	4.10	A
2. Intelligence Research is encourage to all PNP personnel;	4.44	A	3.40	O	3.67	O	4.26	A
3. Briefings are always conducted for Counter intelligence ;	4.49	A	3.52	O	3.67	O	4.31	A
4. Information gathered as Intelligence will always be subjected to assessment;	4.56	A	3.56	O	3.67	O	4.36	A
Column Total (<i>Over-all Mean</i>)	4.45	A	3.42	O	3.62	O	4.26	A

Scale: 1.00 - 1.79 Never Perform; 1.80 - 2.59 Rarely Perform; 2.60 - 3.39 Sometimes Perform; 3.40 - 4.19 Often; 4.20 - 5.00 Always Perform

Shown in table 5 are the data on intelligence operation as an initiative of the Philippine National Police personnel. As shown by the figures on the table, intelligence operation has been found as a natural routine of the Philippine National Police personnel. This claim is made because the overall mean is described as “always perform”.

This implies that intelligence operations were always performed by the PNP personnel in Iligan city as they conduct a covert surveillance operations and research. They also conduct briefings most of the time and when information gathered are made ready and available, they always subject it for assessment and verification.

Along this line, the PNP personnel does not leave themselves behind. They conduct intelligence operations in order to see to it that updates of the current situation in the area could be made available and that any future plans of distraction may be prevented due to the availability of police information and thereby allowing the PNP personnel to plan for future action. With this, the PNP personnel could readily be trusted in conducting intelligence activities and operations so that the PNP personnel can freely move and act to counter the plans of the opponents that would destroy the peace and order situation of a particular place. The results are promising and may boost the public trust espe-

cially of the previous comments of the lawmakers on the failure of intelligence on Marawi attack (Elemia, 2017). As the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) urge to probe intelligence failure in Marawi attacks (Avendano, 2017).

The result is in consonance with the news report (Sadongdong, 2018) that the police intelligence effort, the Philippine National Police improved their regulatory functions. It decentralized firearms and licensing and registration which ease the burden on licensing and it capacitated its Public Safety forces to give more teeth in support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in suppressing insurgency and other threats to internal security. The Philippine National Police had launched the summer public safety and security campaign to ensure a safe and secure summer and holiday season. Even the validation of the Narco list of the 207 barangays village officials were validated by four law enforcement agencies (Caliwan, 2018).

The study of Coyne and Bell (2017) suggested the role of the police has morphed from a simplistic response and enforcement activities to one of managing human security risk, it is argued that intelligence can be used to reduce the impact of strategic surprise from evolving criminal threats and environmental change.

Further, crime incidents in the country have decreased by 8.44 percent over the past 10 months from January to October, owing to “intelligence-driven focused police operation against organized crime groups and street gangs (Ballaran, 2017).

Table 6. Investigation Operation Initiative of the Philippine National Police

Indicators	PNP Personnel		Brgy. Official		Brgy. Tanod		Row Total	
	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE
1. When armed confrontation occurred the scene should be secured and immediately undertake the necessary investigation.	4.52	A	3.52	O	3.63	O	4.32	A
2. Concern police unit shall immediately request the Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team to Conduct Crime Scene Processing.	4.55	A	3.56	O	3.59	O	4.35	A
3. Administrative investigation to determine facts and circumstance for filing cases criminally or administratively	4.55	A	3.76	O	3.53	O	4.35	A
4. Complete sets of SOCO team responds to every crime scene.	4.50	A	3.64	O	3.65	O	4.32	A
Column Total (Over-all Mean)	4.53	A	3.62	O	3.60	O	4.34	A

Scale: 1.00 - 1.79 Never Perform; 1.80 – 2.59 Rarely Perform; 2.60 – 3.39 Sometimes Perform; 3.40 – 4.19 Often; 4.20 – 5.00 Always Perform

Table 6 presents the data on investigation operation initiative of the Philippine National Police personnel. The data on the table clearly emphasized that investigation operation are always performed by the PNP personnel. This could be proven through the over-all means that shows a descriptive equivalent described as “always perform”.

This implies that investigation operations are always performed by the PNP personnel through securing and immediately conducting necessary investigation when armed confrontations occur. During investigation operations, the police unit immediately requests for SOCO team to conduct crime scene processing and prepare facts and circumstances for filing criminal and/or administrative cases. The results are consistent with the announcement of the PNP Camp Crame, Quezon City, Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management

(DIDM) through its school for Investigation and Detective Development reported a 100% fully trained PNP investigators occupying investigation position, (PNP, Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management, 2018).

In addition, according to the current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory, the Philippines has been assessed as level 2 and the police response is capable but limited in its ability to respond to and assist victims of crime and traffic accidents due to a lack of response vehicle, radios and other essential equipment (OSAC, 2018).

In addition, the study of Ludwig et al (2017) is congruent with the result. The role characterizations of crime scene examiners, also have bearing on their effective use in the investigation of high-volume property crime, especially in determining facts and circumstances for filing cases criminally or administratively.

Table 7. SOCO Initiative of the Philippine National Police

Indicators	PNP Personnel		Brgy. Official		Brgy. Tanod		Row Total	
	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE	Mean	DE
1. Responses to calls for assistance in cases of incidents of crime;	4.56	A	3.80	O	3.45	O	4.35	A
2. Join any operations conducted by the local police	4.52	A	3.68	O	3.63	O	4.33	A
3. Gives briefings to Investigator-on-case on lifting to security cordon and release the crime scene;	4.34	A	3.64	O	3.37	S	4.16	A
4. Conduct special processing of crime scene on significant and sensational cases.	4.41	A	3.56	O	3.35	S	4.20	A
Column Total (Over-all Mean)	4.46	A	3.67	O	3.45	O	4.26	A

Scale: 1.00 - 1.79 Never Perform; 1.80 – 2.59 Rarely Perform; 2.60 – 3.39 Sometimes Perform; 3.40 – 4.19 Often; 4.20 – 5.00 Always Perform

Table 7 shows the results on the SOCO initiative of the Philippine National Police. The SOCO initiative receives a very high rating from the respondents because the overall mean that is described as “Always perform”. This implies that Philippine National Police personnel always respond to calls for assistance during the incidence of crime and they join any operations conducted by the local PNP. Briefings to investigator-on-case on lifting to security cordon and release the crime scene described as “sometimes perform” as rated by the barangay tanod. In the conduct of special processing of crime scene on significant and sensational

cases, barangay tanod responded with a descriptive equivalent described as “sometimes perform”.

The result is in congruence with the study of Robertson, White, Kelty, and Julian, (2017) which said that crime scene examiner acts within the broader context of forensic science as a profession. Police forces employ specially trained Crime Scene Examiners (CSEs) to provide forensic science support to the investigation of the crime, a need to develop performance indicators as a measure of effectiveness (Ludwig, Edgar & Maguire, 2017).

Table 8. Crime Rate of Iligan City Before and After the War in Marawi City

Index Crime	Crime Rate Before War				Crime Rate After War		
	2014	2015	2016	Average	2017	2018	Average
Murder	54.0	44.0	62.0	53.3	36.0	21.0	28.50
Homicide	6.0	7.0	5.0	6.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Physical Injuries	110.0	107.0	130.0	115.7	122.0	68.0	95.0
Rape	23.0	21.0	16.0	20.0	28.0	34.0	31.0
Crime Against Person	193.0	179.0	213.0	195.0	191.0	128.0	159.5
Robbery	370.0	250.0	144.0	254.7	92.0	47.0	69.5
Theft	825.0	662.0	314.0	600.3	302.0	96.0	199.0
Carnapping	44.0	63.0	64.0	57.0	30.0	10.0	20.0
Cattle Rustling	6.0	3.0	9.0	6.0	4.0	1.0	2.5
Crimes Against Property	1245.0	978.0	531.0	918.0	428.0	154.0	291.0
Total Index Crime	1438.0	1157.0	744.0	1113.0	619.0	282.0	450.5
Total Non-Index Crime	2590.0	1870.0	987.0	1815.7	1337.0	1090.0	1213.5
Total	575.3	445.1	268.3	429.6	266.2	161.3	213.8

Table 8 shows the crime rate of Iligan City before and after the war in Marawi that dropped significantly. Before the war outbreak in Marawi City, comparing 2014 to 2016 crime rate in Iligan City in terms of its Index crime with an average of 1113.0 to the year 2017 to 2018 crime rate as the outbreak of war with an average of 450.5. It is safe to say that there was a significant dropped of the crime rate in Iligan City in terms of its index crime.

PNP crime volume can be extracted from the total frequency of index crime and that to the non-index crime of a given year (Memorandum Circular No. 94-017). Taking into consideration the population of Iligan city [354,505 projected population as of 2018] and to that of the recorded crime volume, the crime rate can be measured.

Comparing the crime rate before the war in 2014 to 2016 in term of the non-index crime in Iligan City with an average of 1,815.7, the Philippine National Police Personnel in Iligan City have really done their job very well as the non-index crime in Iligan City has had dropped up to the average of 1,213.5 percent even there was an influx of Internally Displace Persons (IDPs) in Iligan City.

As revealed in the table crime against the person such as murder, homicide, physical injuries, and crimes against property such as robbery, theft, carnapping, cattle rustling shows a very observable drop in its crime rate even during and after the outbreak of Marawi City siege. Only the rape crime that is considered as an index crime that has continued rising and needed to be addressed immediately as it gains momentum with an average of 20.0 percent in the year 2014 to 2016 and continues to rise in 2017 to 2018 with an average of 31.0 percent. Overall total, the crime rate in Iligan City with an average of 429.6 before the war fell down to half in 2017 to 2018 with an average of 213.8.

Data shows that there is a steady drop in crime rates from 94.69 average monthly crime rate per 100,000 people in 2014 to 40.69 average monthly crime rate per 100,000 in 2016. It slightly increased the following year to 45.98 average monthly rates per 100,000 people in 2017 but took a large drop to 32.25 average monthly rates per 100,000 people in 2018.

In 2016, the average monthly crime rate was 40.69. This means that for every 100,000 people, there was around 40 incidents of crime every month. This monthly crime rate increased in 2017, wherein the average monthly crime rate was 45.98. This means that for every 100,000 people, there was around 46 incidents of crime every month. This declined in 2018 to 32.25 monthly crime rate. In addition, a total of 282 indexed crime and a total of 1,090 non-indexed crime was recorded. It must be noted though that while there was a decrease in overall crime incidence, crime against the person increased from the year 2015 with a crime rate of 179 to the year 2016 by 19 percent. In 2016, the crimes against person was 213, a substantial increase from 179 in 2015 and 193 in 2014. It must be noted also that there was an increase in overall crime incidence in rape crime in 2018 as considered by the Philippine National Police as Crimes against persons compared to four preceding years from 2014-2017. Homicide remains constant in terms of crime incidents in 2016 to 2018.

In addition, in 2015 murder cases was recorded as 44, it gradually increased to forty-one percent in 2016 as 62. In 2017 as 36 and continue to decline in 2018 as 21. Furthermore, it cannot be denied the increase of index crime in 2016 such as murder as 62 and physical injuries as 130 respectively, when compared to 2015 and the number was still high in 2017. In reiteration, rape cases show a significant increase, and any police action should be done accordingly.

The battle in Marawi City lasted for five months [23 May-23 October 2017] throughout the year of 2017, there had been an almost 13 percent increase in recorded crime volume for the entire Iligan City from 2016 to 2017 (FOI Tracking Nr iliganpcpo-2018-1204-004).

The result is in consonance with the Philippine National Police visibility through its manning level of a 1:700 police-to population ratio in 2010; 1:600 in 2020; and 1:500 in 2030 (PNP transformation Roadmap 2030 at pnp.gov.ph). Based on the PNP-Iligan validated crime statistics from 2014 to 2018, there appears to be an increasing trend in crime solution efficiency (Freedom of Information Tracking Nr iliganpcpo-2018-1204-004).

Table 9. *Correlation of Crime Before and After the War*

Crime Index		Paired Differences			t-value	p-value
		Mean	SD	Std. Error Mean		
Murder	Before - After	34.3	24.1	13.9	2.469	.132
Homicide	Before - After	2.7	2.1	1.2	2.219	.157
Physical Injuries	Before - After	52.3	71.9	41.5	1.260	.335
Rape	Before - After	-.7	14.9	8.6	-.077	.946
Crime Against Person	Before - After	88.7	110.4	63.8	1.391	.299
Robbery	Before - After	208.3	67.16	38.8	5.373	.033*
Theft	Before - After	467.7	134.8	77.8	6.009	.027*
Carnapping	Before - After	43.7	26.3	15.2	2.879	.102
Cattle Rustling	Before - After	4.3	4.0	2.3	1.857	.204
Crimes Against Property	Before - After	724.0	167.2	96.5	7.501	.017*
Total Index Crime	Before - After	812.7	65.7	37.9	21.415	.002*
Total Non Index Crime	Before - After	1006.7	237.1	136.9	7.353	.018*

*Significant at the 0.05 level

Table 9 portrays the crime index in Iligan City before and after the war in Marawi City. It showed that there was a significant difference in the crime index in terms of the Index crime and non-index crime in Iligan City. Further, it was perceived that crime against person such as murder, homicide, physical injuries rape, and crime against property such as carnapping, cattle rustling have no significant difference in its crime index compared before the war and after the war in Marawi city.

In addition, the data also revealed that there was a significant difference in crimes against property with a p-value of .017 which is a significant level because of the computed p-value which is less than 0.05. Therefore there is a significant difference between the crime before the war and after the war in terms of the crimes against property. Robbery with a p-value of .033 that is significant at the 0.05 level

and theft with a p-value of .027 that is significant at the 0.05 level.

This implies that the effort of the Philippine National Police in adhering the implementation to its operational procedure in securing Iligan City against any crime involving property was effective. With the continuous conduct of police operations and with the implementation of curfew ordinance the people of Iligan City are safe.

The table also showed the significant difference of crime before the war and after the war on index crime with a p-value of .002 which is significant at 0.05 level because the computed value was less than 0.05. This means that crimes against person and crimes against property has a significant difference before and after the war in Marawi City. Along this line, the non-index crime with a p-value of .018 which was significant because the p-value is less than 0.05 level.

Table 10. *Correlation of Frequency of Implementation of Police Operation of PNP-Iligan and the Crime Rate in terms of Indexed and Non-Indexed Crime.*

Variables		Crime Rate (Correlation Coefficient)
Index Crime	Public Safety Operation	-.642**
	Law Enforcement Operation	-.418*
	Internal Security Operation	-.421*
	Special Police Operation	-.428*
	Intelligence Operation	-.495**
	Investigation Operation	-.457*

Variables		Crime Rate (Correlation Coefficient)
Non Index Crime	Scene of the Crime Operation	-.471*
	Public Safety Operation	-.449*
	Law Enforcement Operation	-.523**
	Internal Security Operation	-.492**
	Special Police Operation	-.543**
	Intelligence Operation	-.481*
	Investigation Operation	-.550**
	Scene of the Crime Operation	-.658**

**p < .01; *p < .05

Table 10 showed the extent of the relationship of the frequency of implementation of the police operation and the crime rate in terms of indexed and non-indexed crime. The data revealed that the null hypothesis had been rejected.

The data showed that in crime rate with a correlation coefficient of -.642 on public safety operation means that it was highly implemented in index crime and the crime rate with a correlation coefficient of -.449 on non-index crime.

Further, data showed that in crime rate with a correlation coefficient of -.471 on Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) means that it was highly implemented in index crime and the crime rate with a correlation coefficient of -.658 on non-index crime as they are mandated to respond once the crime scene involves human lives.

There was a substantial relationship between the frequency of implementation of the PNP personnel of Iligan City in terms of police operations and the crime rate in terms of indexed and non-indexed crime. The more the PNP initiatives on the promotion of peace and order is implemented such as the public safety operation, law enforcement operation, internal security operation, special police operation, intelligence operation, investigation operation, and scene of the crime operation, the lesser is the crime rate.

This implies that the heightened alert status of the PNP personnel of Iligan City which is manifested by highly implementing the police operational procedure of 2013 helped in the statistical decrease of crime rate in terms of the

index and non-index crime. The result is in consonance with the study of Bradford et al (2017) that suggested that seeing regular police patrols and being informed about police activities are associated with higher opinions of effectiveness and community engagement. The ability of the police to improve the quality of contacts and, perhaps, public confidence. Effective educational and training programs remain the foundation for proactive crisis intervention strategies concerning public safety education, terrorism and crisis intervention strategies. Global social change has countless implications for public safety, homeland security and disaster planning (Baker, 2008).

Conclusion

Based on the findings of the study, the researcher hereby concludes that Philippine National Police initiatives in the promotion of peace and order in Iligan City anchoring into the Police Operational Procedure is always performed and its implementation has a significant relationship in the decrease of crime rate, as higher was the implementation of police operation the lower was the crime rate. Contrary wise, the implementation does not affect the increase of the crime rate in rape cases. This implies that PNP personnel of Iligan City failed to create a more effective instrument in protecting the Iliganons, especially the women, from the most heinous form of sexual violence. The recommendation stated above will help the PNP, the LGUs into a more gender-responsive one as it addresses the gaps in the promotion of peace and order while implementing Martial Law in Mindanao and the community will be

guided where to reach out when they will be a victim of rape crime.

Recommendations

1. Collaborate to establish a system to monitor complaints filed with both agencies that claim inadequate police response to a report of rape crime. Further, to the extent of information about those complaints, the city Mayor and appropriate city officials should be furnished with a copy of the study.
2. The city Mayor may establish an annual index crime and non-index crime data (e.g. rape cases) collected by the PNP and transmit the summary and recommendations to the Iligan city council. This allows the other agencies within Iligan City to see trends more clearly and be able to better tailor initiatives to address the problem (e.g. rape crime).
3. PNP may utilize an existing framework or make a new framework to address community concerns about police responsiveness to rape cases and work with its task force partner to ensure that all constituencies receive education and outreach, particularly groups for whom rape cases data suggest underreporting.
4. To the future researchers, criminal profiling is indispensable to understand the deep-rooted cause of the rise of rape crime in Iligan City. The researcher may also include the free access to social media on Cybersex videos and pictures and various websites on the internet.

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